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  This paper presents a dynamic general equilibrium analysis of public sector 
corruption and economic growth. In an economy with government 
intervention and capital accumulation, state-appointed bureaucrats are charged 
with the responsibility for procuring public goods which contribute to 
productive efficiency. Corruption arises because of an opportunity for 
bureaucrats to appropriate public funds by misinforming the government about 
the cost and quality of public goods provision. The incentive for each 
bureaucrat to do this depends on economy-wide outcomes which, in turn, 
depend on the behaviour of all bureaucrats. We establish the existence of 
multiple development regimes, together with the possibility of multiple, 
frequency-dependent equilibria. The predictions of our analysis accord strongly 
with recent empirical evidence on the causes and consequences of corruption 






Corruption has become the lead topic of debate among all major interna-
tional development agencies. The World Bank, for example, has identified 
corruption as the single greatest obstacle to economic and social develop-
ment, and has given priority to anti-corruption initiatives in its strategies 
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WWW.ST-ANDREWS.AC.UK/ECONOMICS/CDMA/CDMA.SHTML for improving the quality of governance.1 Of most concern is corruption
within society’s state institutions. Public oﬃcials - politicians, bureaucrats
and legislators - hold unique positions of power and responsibility, the abuse
of which can cause signiﬁcant and long-lasting damage to many aspects of
socio-economic development. Such individuals may have privelaged in-roads
to the legal infrastructure, oﬀering them the opportunity to avoid prosecu-
tion for any malpractice. Dishonest behaviour at one level in public oﬃce is
often contagious and often supported by dishonest behaviour at other levels.
For these and other reasons, public sector corruption is viewed as being es-
pecially harmful, especially pervasive and especially diﬃcult to ﬁght. While
some countries have largely overcome these problems, many others appear
to be trapped in a vicious circle of widespread poverty and wholesale mis-
governance. This paper presents a simple model to explain the diversity and
persistence of corruption around the world.2
A useful working deﬁnition of public sector corruption is the abuse of
authority by public oﬃcials to make personal gains. One manifestation of
this is when civil servants, or bureaucrats, exploit their powers of discre-
tion, delegated to them by the government, to further their own interests by
indulging in illegal, or unauthorised, activities.3 These activities can take
various forms, including bribery, embezzlement, extortion and fraud. The
i n c e n t i v e st oe n g a g ei nt h e mr e ﬂect the hierarchical structure of public or-
ganisations, within which there are almost inevitable conﬂicts of interest and
asymmetries of information between superiors and subordinates. As a con-
sequence, the objectives of the former may be compromised by the decisions
of the latter to act strategically and dishonestly in pursuit of their own hid-
den agenda. The conceptual framework that is used to study this type of
environment is the framework of principal-agent theory. For the most part,
this theory has been applied within the context of partial equilibrium models
for the purpose of understanding the microfoundations of corrupt behaviour,
including the incentives that may motivate or deter such behaviour and the
implications for eﬃciency and welfare in the event of the former (e.g., Baner-
1The connection between corruption and governance is two-way causal: corrup-
tion undermines good governance, while bad governance fosters corruption. For
an appreciation of the importance of corruption to international policy makers, see
the World Bank and IMF web-sites, www.worldbank.org/publicsector/anticorrupt and
www.imf.org/external/np/exp/facts/gov.
2The literature on corruption is extensive and includes contributions from all areas
of social science using a variety of research methods. For some excellent reviews of the
literature with a special emphasis on corruption and development, see Bardhan (1997),
Jain (2001), Rose-Ackerman (1999) and Tanzi (1998).
3This is referred to as bureaucratic corruption, as distinct from political and legislative
corruption which may also arise within the public sector (e.g., Jain 2001).
2jee 1997; Carrillo 2000; Klitgaard 1988, 1990; Rose-Ackerman 1975, 1978,
1999; Shleifer and Vishny 1993). Much less research has been undertaken
from a macroeconomic perspective with the view to modelling the dynamic
general equilibrium interactions between public sector corruption and eco-
nomic development. This is no doubt due to the complex, multi-dimensional
nature of these interactions, the aggregation of which may be diﬃcult to con-
ceptualise. Nevertheless, economists are much better equipped today than
t h e yw e r ei nt h ep a s tf o rr i s i n gt ot h ec h a l l e n g ew i t ht o o l sa n dt e c h n i q u e s
that enable analytical rigour and precision.
Empirical work on corruption has ﬂourished over recent years. This has
been due to the publication of several cross-country data sets that are widely
regarded as providing reliable measures of corrupt activity. These data sets,
or corruption indices, have been compiled by various international organisa-
tions (most notably Business International Corporation, Political Risk Ser-
vices Incorporated and Transparency International) using questionnaire sur-
veys sent to networks of correspondents around the world. The surveys are
designed to produce a ranking of countries in terms of the extent to which
corruption is perceived to exist (e.g., the extent to which public oﬃcials
are believed to accept bribes, to make fraudulent demands and to embez-
zle public funds). A major reason why the indices are taken seriously is
that they all give very similar rankings, as reﬂected in the fact that they
are all highly correlated with each other.4 Of the many empirical ﬁndings,
one of the most compelling is a strong negative relationship between cor-
ruption and development. This is reported in a number of diﬀerent studies
which yield predictions of signiﬁcant adverse eﬀects of corruption on growth
(e.g., Gyimah-Brempong 2000; Li et al. 2000; Mauro 1995; United Nations
1989). These and other investigations also provide evidence on various ways
in which corruption might take hold, such as lowering rates of investment
(e.g., Mauro 1995), creating obstacles to doing business (e.g., World Bank
2002), reducing inﬂows of foreign capital (e.g., Lambsdorﬀ 2003; Wei 2000)
and causing misallocations of public expenditures (e.g., Mauro 1997; Tanzi
a n dD a v o o d i1 9 9 7 ) .I nc o n t r a s t ,t h e r ei sv e r yl i t t l ee v i d e n c et os u p p o r tt h e
view that corruption might actually be good for growth by helping to circum-
vent cumbersome regulations (red tape) in the bureacratic process.5 This is
4For more detailed discussions of the indices, see Jain (1998), Tanzi and Davoodi (1997)
and Treisman (2000).
5This view, which may also be challenged on conceptual grounds, is based on the
idea that bribes may act as “speed money” which bureaucrats accept in return for by-
passing institutional hurdles (e.g., Huntington 1968; Leﬀ 1964; Leys 1970). More recent
expositions of eﬃciency-enhancing corruption can be found in Lui (1985) and Acemoglou
and Verdier (1998). The former suggests that bribes may form part of a Nash equilibrium
3true even for countries that are reportedly mired with such regulations (e.g.,
Ades and Di Tella 1997; Mauro 1995; Kauﬀman and Wei 2000). Another
notable ﬁnding is that the relationship between corruption and development
appears to be two-way causal. Thus it has been estimated that a signiﬁ-
cant proportion of the variations in corruption indices can be explained by
variations in per-capita income levels (e.g., Ades and Di Tella 1999; Husted
1999; Montinola and Jackman 1999; Treisman 2000).6 In addition, the idea
that corruption and poverty may co-exist as persistent, rather than transient,
phenomena, is suggested by the casual observation that many of the most
poor and corrupt countries of the past are among the most poor and corrupt
countries of today (e.g., Bardhan 1997; Sah 1988).7 This conjures up the
notion of poverty traps from which there may be no easy escape unless there
are radical improvements in the quality of governance.
By way of illustrating the relationship between corruption and develop-
ment, we present Table 1 which is constructed on the basis of the World
Bank’s income classiﬁcation of countries, together with the corruption in-
dices of Business International Corporation (BIC), International Country
Risk Guide (ICRG) and Transparency International (TI). The data reveal
considerable diversity in the incidence of corruption, with poor countries hav-
ing a much higher corruption rating than rich countries, irrespective of which
index is used. This is indicative of the negative correlation between corrup-
tion and development that has been reported in recent empirical studies. In
addition to this, there is another notable feature of the data that has received
much less exposure - namely, the diversity in corruption levels among coun-
tries within the same income group. This is especially pronounced among
middle-income countries, for which the range of each corruption index is sig-
niﬁcantly larger than the range for either low-income or high-income coun-
strategy in a non-cooperative game, where ineﬃciency in public administration is reduced
by the minimisation of waiting costs. The latter suggest that some degree of corruption
may be part of an optimal allocation in the presence of incomplete contracts since public
oﬃcials, though corrupt, can help in the enforcement of property rights. A similar idea
is expressed in Acemoglou and Verdier (2000) who argue more generally that corruption
may be the necessary price to pay for correcting market failures.
6Other factors that appear to be signiﬁcant in determining corruption are the colonial
heritage, religious tradition, legal system, federal structure, democratisation and openness
to trade of a country. There is also evidence that corruption is inﬂuenced by gender, with
males being the more corruptible of the sexes (e.g., Husted 1999; Swamy et al. 2001).
Conﬁdence in the success of corrupt deals appears to be an important factor in fostering
the spread of corruption (e.g., Lambsdorﬀ 2002).
7Examples include Bangladesh, Cameroon, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Nigeria, Pakistan
and Uganda. According to the data from Transparency International, these belong to
a set of countries that have displayed little, or no, improvement in their corruption and
growth records since the early 1980s.
4tries. A comparison of the variances of the indices across diﬀerent groups
of countries gives the same impression: the variance for the middle-income
group is consistently higher than the variance for either the low- or high-
income groups, in spite of the denser and larger sample of the middle-income
group. Whichever way one looks at it, the picture that emerges is one of high
levels of corruption among poor countries, low levels of corruption among rich
countries and varying levels of corruption among middle-income countries.
As indicated earlier, there exists relatively little theoretical work on the
relationship between corruption and development. Two recent exceptions
are the analyses of Ehrlich and Lui (1999) and Sarte (2000).8 The former
develop a model in which opportunities to proﬁt from bureaucratic malprac-
tice create incentives for individuals to compete for the privelage of holding
public oﬃce. These incentives lead to a diversion of resources away from
growth-promoting activities (investments in human capital) towards power-
seeking activities (investments in political capital). The latter constructs a
framework in which rent-seeking bureaucrats restrict the entry of ﬁrms into
the formal sector of the economy which has a better system of property rights
and law enforcement than the informal sector. When the costs of informality
are high, growth is reduced relative to the free-entry case. These analyses
a r er e v e a l i n ga b o u tt h ew a yi nw h i c hc o r r u p t i o nc a nh a v ea d v e r s ee ﬀects on
the prospective fortunes of an economy. They are less clear about why cor-
ruption may arise in the ﬁrst place, why corruption may persist or decline
over time, and why corruption may vary across otherwise similar economies.
We seek to provide answers to these questions in the present paper.
The speciﬁc focus of our analysis is on corruption in public procurement.
In general, corruption can aﬀect both the volume and composition of pub-
lic expenditures in ways that undermine development and foster inequality.
Public funds earmarked for vital areas of spending may simply go missing
and never be reclaimed. Purchases of goods and services may be based on
who oﬀers the best kickbacks, rather than who oﬀers the best price-quality
combination. Entire public programmes may be chosen more for their capac-
ity to generate illegal income than for their potential to improve standards of
living. Empirical studies suggest that corruption is, indeed, associated with
a misallocation and misappropriation of public expenditures which are often
inﬂated as a result.9 Gupta et al. (2000) ﬁnd that corruption has the eﬀect of
8See also Rivera-Batiz (2001) who studies the relationship between corruption, growth
and ﬁnancial liberalisation.
9In general, the incentives and opportunities to engage in corruption are greatest in
areas of public procurement that involve large-scale expenditures, complex technologies
and monopolistic power. For example, purchases of miltary hardware (specialised, high
technology goods produced by a limited number of ﬁrms) oﬀer greater scope for rent-
5reducing the provision of education and health care, and of increasing infant
mortality. Mauro (1997) presents evidence that corruption distorts public
expenditures away from growth-promoting areas (like education and health)
towards other types of project (e.g., infrastructure investment) that are less
productivity-enhancing. In a similar vein, Tanzi and Davoodi (1997) ﬁnd
that corruption leads to a diversion of public funds to where bribes are easi-
est to collect, implying a bias in the composition of public spending towards
low-productivity projects (e.g., large-scale construction) at the expense of
value-enhancing investments (e.g., maintenance of the existing infrastruc-
ture). The same authors conclude that, as a result of corruption, the amount
of public investment tends to rise, while the quality of this investment tends
to fall. There is almost a limitless supply of anecdotal evidence as well.10
Abbott (1988) reports the instance in Haiti when a prominent member of
the Duvalier regime had 150 kilometres of railtrack pulled up and sold for
scrap metal, pocketing the proceeds for himself. Hardin (1993) recounts the
case of the Turkwell Gorge Dam project in Kenya, the ﬁnal cost of which
was more than double the amount of initial estimates due to the recoupment
of bribe payments by the French contractor. Rose-Ackerman (1999) tells of
the millions of dollars of non-existent stationary that was “purchased” by
the Government Press Fund in Malawi, and describes how telephone speci-
ﬁcations in another African country contained the useless requirement that
the equipment must be robust to freezing temperatures (a requirement that
could be satisﬁed by only one telephone manufacturer from Scandinavia).
These, and countless other, examples bear testimony to the problems that
face many developing countries. The scale of the oﬀences and the ingenuity
of those behind them are often quite staggering, and it is diﬃcult not to
be shocked by the insidiousness of individuals in extracting public resources
from an already deprived nation to which they, themselves, belong.11
The model that we use for our analysis describes an overlapping gener-
ations economy in which the government instructs bureaucrats to provide
public goods that function as inputs to private production and that are ﬁ-
seeking than purchases of medical supplies (standardised products sold in open markets
by a large number of ﬁrms).
10The single most extensive source of evidence is the World Bank’s web-site, referred to
in footnote 1. For a particularly perplexing account of the experiences of many African
countries, see also www.freeafrica.org.
11This is not to say that similar oﬀences are never committed in developed economies.
For example, Rose-Ackerman (1999) describes a recent episode in Italy (a country with a
consistently high corruption rating) when the costs of several major construction projects
fell dramatically after various anti-corruption investigations: the cost of a subway fell by
$130 million per kilometre, of a rail link by $28 million per kilometre, and of an airport
terminal by $1.9 billion in total.
6nanced from taxes on households. A public good yields productive services
of either low-quality or high-quality, and is procured at either low-cost or
high-cost. The true characteristics of goods are known only to bureaucrats,
implying an informational asymmetry that may motivate corrupt behaviour.
In particular, bureaucrats may be tempted to deceive the government by
claiming to deliver goods of high-quality at high-cost when they are actually
providing goods of low-quality at low-cost. By doing this, bureaucrats inﬂate
(artiﬁcially) the amount of public funds that must be raised and allow them-
selves an opportunity to embezzle some of these funds.12 Such behaviour
is risky since there is always a possibility that the government will detect
it, in which case a bureaucrat will be dismissed from his job without pay.
Such behaviour is costly for society because it reduces capital accumulation
through which growth and development take place.
A key implication of our analysis is that the incentive for a bureaucrat
to engage in corruption depends on economy-wide outcomes which, in turn,
depend on the existing stock of capital and the behaviour of all other bu-
reaucrats. This leads to the following observations. First, corruption and
development are determined jointly in a relationship that is two-way causal.
This relationship shows how the quality of governance not only inﬂuences,
but is also inﬂuenced by, the level of economic activity. Second, bureaucratic
decision making entails strategic interactions that may give rise to multi-
ple, frequency-dependent equilibria associated with diﬀerent (high and low)
incidences of corruption. In general, such non-uniqueness is explained by ap-
pealing to the notion that, for one reason or another, an individual is more
likely to be corrupt if others are corrupt, and vice versa. For example, the
more corrupt people there are, the less might be the probability that each one
of them will be caught, the less might by the penalty that each one of them
will incur and the less might be the moral costs, or stigma, that each one of
them feels. These ideas have been incorporated into several partial equilib-
12Embezzlement - the theft by an individual of resources that he is supposed to admin-
ister - is an especially diﬃcult oﬀence to deal with when it entails the misappropriation of
public funds. While everyone in society may be aﬀected, the fact that no private property
is stolen or exchanged means that individuals have no legal rights by which to protest and
seek compensation. This type of non-collusive corruption may pose just as many problems
as more collusive forms (where beneﬁts accrue to all parties involved), and there is evidence
that both types are pervasive in developing countries (e.g., Foellmi and Oechslin 2003).
Indeed, in many of the most corrupt countries, embezzlement is a major aspect of public
sector misconduct, often more important than bribery. As it happens, our model could be
reformulated as one in which bribery, rather than embezzlement, is the means by which
bureaucrats extract resources. This would involve specifying a separate sector of produc-
ers from whom bureaucrats procure goods and with whom bureaucrats may conspire in
deceiving the government. We choose the present formulation for simplicity.
7rium models of corruption, typical of which are the frameworks of Andvig
and Moene (1990) and Cadot (1987), where non-uniqueness arises because a
bureaucrat’s expected punishment for being corrupt is a decreasing function
of the number of other corrupt bureaucrats.13 In a slightly diﬀerent vein,
Tirole (1996) shows how group reputation eﬀects may lead to multiple equi-
libria that are history-dependent in the sense that good or bad behaviour in
the past motivates good or bad behaviour in the present. Our own account
of the phenoemena stands in contrast to these analyses and relates to the
impact of corruption on aggregate economic outcomes that inﬂuence indi-
vidual decision making. Ceteris paribus, the higher is the level of corruption
the lower are the levels of wages and interest rates. Since incomes are lower
as a result, a bureaucrat who is corrupt stands to lose less if he is caught
so that the incentive to be corrupt is stronger. In this way, a bureaucrat’s
compliance in corruption may depend critically on the compliance of others
- hence the possibility of contagious behaviour and, with this, multiple equi-
libria. We emphasise that this is only a possibility in our model for there
are circumstances where such behaviour disappears and a unique equilibrium
exists. Signiﬁcantly, these circumstances relate to the level of development.
This is another distinguishing feature of our analysis. Up to now, the ques-
tion of how an economy may move from one equilibrium to another has been
addressed largely on the basis of comparative static exercises (i.e., studying
the eﬀects of exogenous changes in parameter values). In our case the se-
lection of an equilibrium is partly endogenous, being linked to an economy’s
position along its capital accumulation path.
The above features of our model imply the existence of threshold eﬀects
and multiple development regimes. Below some critical level of capital, there
is a low development regime that displays a unique equilibrium in which the
incidence of corruption is high. Above some other critical level of capital,
there is a high development regime that displays a unique equilibrium in
which the incidence of corruption is low. And in between the two thresholds,
there is an intermediate development regime that displays both types of equi-
libria. Accordingly, our analysis is able to explain two of the most prominent
aspects of the data, alluded to earlier - namely, the higher levels of corruption
in poor countries than in rich countries, and the diverse levels of corruption
among middle-income countries. The precise way in which corruption takes
hold in our model is by distorting both the amount and composition of public
expenditures: as a consequence of bureaucrats’ malfeasance, these expendi-
13The incidence of crime has been explained in a similar way. In Sah (1991), for example,
an individual is more (less) likely to engage in criminal activity if there are many (few)
others engaged in such activity because the chances that he will be caught are lower
(higher).
8tures are not only excessive but also misallocated towards the provision of
low-quality public goods. This concurs with empirical evidence as well. Addi-
tionally, we establish the result that, depending on circumstances, transition
between development regimes may or may not be feasible. In the case of the
latter, the limiting outcome of the economy hinges crucially on initial condi-
tions. Most notably, if the economy is poor and corrupt to begin with, then
it will be destined to remain poor and corrupt unless fundamental changes
take place. In this way, our analysis also provides an account of why poverty
and corruption may co-exist as persistent phenomena, as they clearly have
done in many countries.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we
describe the economic environment. In Section 3 we identify conditions under
which an individual bureaucrat will be corrupt. In Section 4 we establish the
existence of alternative equilibria. In Section 5 we analyse the implications
for public expenditures and capital accumulation. In Section 6 we make a
few concluding remarks.
2T h e M o d e l
Time is discrete and indexed by t =0 ,..,∞. There is a constant population
of two-period-lived agents belonging to overlapping generations of dynastic
families. Agents of each generation are divided into two groups of citizens -
private individuals (or households), of whom there are m, and public servants
(or bureaucrats), of whom there are n<m .14 All agents are risk neutral,
working only when young and consuming only when old. Households work for
ﬁrms in the production of output, while bureaucrats work for the government
in the administration of public policy. Public policy consists of a programme
of taxes and expenditures designed to make available public goods and ser-
vices which contribute to the eﬃciency of output production. Corruption
arises from the incentive of a bureaucrat to appropriate public funds by falsi-
fying information to the government. We assume that a fraction, ν ∈ (0,1),
of bureaucrats are corruptible in this way, while the remaining fraction, 1−ν,
are non-corruptible, with the identity of a bureaucrat being unobservable by
the government.15 Firms, of which there is a unit mass, hire labour from
households and rent capital from all agents in perfectly competitive markets.
14We assume that agents are diﬀerentiated at birth according to their abilities and
skills. A population of m agents lack the skills necessary to become bureaucrats, while a
population of n agents posess these skills. The latter are induced to become bureaucrats
by an allocation of talent condition established below.
15This assumption may be thought of as capturing diﬀerences in the propensities of
bureaucrats to engage in corruption, whether due to diﬀerences in proﬁciencies at be-
92.1 The Private Sector
Each ﬁrm combines lt units of labour with kt units of capital to produce yt





β,A > 0,α , β∈ (0,1) (1)
where Kt denotes the aggregate stock of capital and G denotes the aggre-
gate quality of public goods and services.16 The ﬁrm hires labour at the
competitively-determined wage rate wt and rents capital at the competitively-










t Gβ. In equilibrium lt = l (the ﬁxed supply of
labour) and kt = Kt so that we may write these conditions as
wt = αAl
α−1G
βkt ≡ w(kt), (2)
rt =( 1− α)Al
αG
β ≡ r (3)
Thus the equilibrium wage is proportional to the capital stock, while the
equilibrium interest rate is constant.
Each young household of generation t is endowed with λ>1 units of
labour (implying l = λm) which it supplies inelastically to ﬁr m si nr e t u r nf o r
aw a g eo fwt. Each household also receives an inheritance of bt and is liable
to pay taxes of τt. A household saves its entire net income at the market rate
of interest r to obtain a ﬁnal level of wealth of (1 + r)(λwt − τt + bt) when
i tr e a c h e so l d - a g e .I tt h e nc o n s u m e sp a r to ft h i sw e a l t ha n db e q u e a t h st h e
remainder to its own oﬀspring. The lifetime utility of a household is given
by ut =( 1+r)(λwt − τt + bt) − bt+1 + v(bt+1),w h e r e(1 + r)(λwt − τt +
bt)−bt+1 is consumption and v(·) is a strictly concave function that satisﬁes
the usual Inada conditions.17 It follows that utility is maximised by setting
v0(·)=1 , implying an optimal ﬁxed size of bequest from one generation
to the next: that is, bt+1 = b for all t. Changes in household incomes are
therefore governed by changes in wages and changes in taxes.18
ing corrupt or diﬀerences in moral attitudes towards being corrupt (e.g., Acemoglou and
Verdier 2000; Besley and McClaren 1993; Tirole 1996).
16As in other models of growth, we incorporate the aggregate stock of capital to capture
the positive externalities associated with learning-by-doing (e.g., Romer 1986). As in
other models as well, we treat public goods as providing productive services which raise
the eﬃciency of other inputs in private production (e.g., Barro 1990).
17This function captures the ‘warm-glow’, or ‘joy-of-giving’ motive for making bequests.
We choose this simple way of modelling altruism since the main role of bequests in our
model is merely to ensure the existence of a non-degenerate steady state equilibrium along
a linear (rather than concave) capital accumulation path.
18Appropriate restrictions on parameter values ensure that the after-tax income of a
household is always positive.
102.2 The Public Sector
The objective of the government is to provide public goods and services
which function as inputs to private production. The government demands
g amount of these goods and delegates the task of procuring them to bu-
reaucrats, while running a continuously balanced budget.19 In return for his
services, a bureaucrat is paid a salary which is determined as follows. Any
bureaucrat (whether corruptible or non-corruptible) can work for a ﬁrm to
receive an income equal to the wage paid to households. Any bureaucrat
who is willing to accept a salary less than this wage must be expecting to
receive compensation through some form of malpractice and is therefore im-
mediately identiﬁed as being corrupt. We assume that a bureaucrat who is
discovered to be corrupt is ﬁned by an amount at least equal to his salary
(i.e., he is dismissed without pay) and that any remaining (illegal) income
in his possession is strictly less than the wage that he would have received
by working for ﬁrms.20 Given this, then no corruptible bureaucrat would
ever reveal himself in the way described above. As such, the government
can minimise its labour costs, while ensuring complete bureaucratic partic-
ipation, by setting the salaries of all bureaucrats equal to the wage paid
by ﬁrms to households.21 Against this background, the government keeps a
check on bureaucratic behaviour using an imprecise monitoring technology.
This technology implies that a bureaucrat who is corrupt faces a probability,
p ∈ (0,1), of avoiding detection, and a probability, 1−p, of being found out.
For convenience, we assume that monitoring is costless.22
Each bureaucrat is charged with the responsibility for procuring
g
n units
of public goods using whatever public funds are allocated to him. A public
good may be of either high-quality or low-quality and may be procured at
either high-cost or low-cost. One unit of a high-quality good yields 1 unit
of productive service, while one unit of a low-quality good yields γ<1
19Bureaucrats are also responsible for the collection of taxes, an activity that may also
be open to abuse in the form of bribery and tax evasion. This does not arise in our model
because all households have the same income and are subject to same tax liability.
20As we shall see, the latter assumption amounts merely to a restriction on initial
conditions - in particular, the initial capital stock which determines the initial wage. The
assumption would be irrelevant if one was to suppose that the bureaucrat is ﬁned the full
amount of his legal and illegal income.
21This has the same interpretation as the allocation of talent condition in Acemoglou
and Verdier (2000). The government cannot force any of the n potential bureaucrats to
actually take up public oﬃc e ,b u ti ti sa b l et oi n d u c ea l lo ft h e mt od os ob yp a y i n gw h a t
they would earn elsewhere.
22The model could be extended straightforwardly to allow for costly monitoring without
altering its main implications. To a large extent, our results would be strengthened in the
sense that there would be an additional loss of resources from corruption.
11units of productive service. The cost of the former is a random variable
which we assume to be identically and independently distributed, and to
take the value of 1 unit of output with probability q ∈ (0,1) and the value
of φ>1 units of ouptut with probability 1 − q. The cost of the latter is
θ<1 units of output with certainty.23 C o r r u p t i o ni sm a d ep o s s i b l ed u e
to informational asymmetries between bureaucrats and the government as
a consequence of the delegation of duties by the latter to the former. It
is bureaucrats who evaluate public goods in terms of their cost and quality,
and who supply the government with information on which to base decisions.
By falsifying this information, a bureaucrat may be able to enrich himself
through the appropriation of public funds. More precisely, we assume that
only bureaucrats are informed about the true cost and quality of public
goods. All that the government knows is that a public good may be of high-
quality or low-quality, and that the per unit cost of any high-quality good is
1 or φ. Given this state of aﬀairs, the government instructs each bureaucrat
to maximise public good quality per unit of expenditure. For a high-quality
good, there is an upper value and a lower value of this, as given by 1 and 1
φ,
respectively. For a low-quality good, the value is
γ
θ. We conﬁne our attention
to the case in which 1
φ >
γ
θ. Under such circumstances, the government will
always demand high-quality goods, whatever their alleged cost.
A bureaucrat, when young, is endowed with one unit of labour which he
supplies inelastically to the government to earn a salary of wt. For simplicity,
we assume that bureaucrats have no other source of legal income and are
exempt from paying any taxes.24 Like all households, all bureaucrats save
t h e i re n t i r ei n c o m ea tt h er a t eo fi n t e r e s tr in order to ﬁnance retirement
consumption. By deﬁnition, a bureaucrat who is not corrupt abides fully by
the government’s instructions for providing public goods. Such a bureaucrat
procures
g






and a true total
quality of
g
n.T h eﬁnal wealth of a non-corrupt bureaucrat is (1 + r)wt.I n
contrast, a bureaucrat who is corrupt pursues his own hidden agenda which
conﬂicts with the interests of the government. Such a bureaucrat engages in
deception by procuring low-quality public goods at low-cost, while claiming
that the goods are of high-quality and high-cost. Although the quantity of
each good is still
g


















23As indicated earlier, the eﬀect of corruption in our model is that public goods are
provided at a lower overall quality but greater total expense. The latter result is due to
the variability in cost of high-quality goods. The former result prevails regardless of this
assumption.
24The fact that bureaucrats have only one unit of labour (as opposed to λ units) may
be used to justify this assumption.
12amount of funds that a bureaucrat is able to embezzle by misleading the
government. In general, corrupt individuals may try to remain inconspicuous
by concealing their illegal income, by investing this income diﬀerently from
legal income and by altering their patterns of expenditure. For the purposes
of the present analysis, we make the simple assumption that a bureaucrat
who is corrupt must store his illegal income in hiding (rather than invest it
in capital) if he is to stand any chance of not being caught. In doing this,
the bureaucrat is assured of retaining his illegal income whether he is caught
or not, and of losing only his legal income in the event of the former.25









with probability 1 − p, implying an expected





3 T h eI n c e n t i v et ob eC o r r u p t
A corruptible bureaucrat will embezzle public funds if his expected payoﬀ
f r o md o i n gs oi sn ol e s st h a nh i sp a y o ﬀ from not doing so. From the preceding








≥ (1 − p)(1 + r)wt. (4)
I n t u i t i v e l y ,ab u r e a u c r a ti sm o r el i k e l yt ob ec o r r u p tt h em o r eh es t a n d st o
gain in illegal income and the less he expects to lose in legal income if he
is caught. The key feature of the condition in (4) is that it depends on the
economy-wide variables r and wt. Both of these variables - the interest rate
and the wage rate - are determined by current events in the economy. In par-
ticular, they are both functions of the aggregate level of corruption at time
t,a sw es h a l ls e eb e l o w .T h i sm e a n st h a tt h em o t i v a t i o nf o re a c hc o r r u p t i b l e
bureaucrat to be corrupt depends on the number of other such bureaucrats
who are expected to be corrupt. Consequently, bureaucratic behaviour en-
tails strategic interactions which may result in multiple, frequency-dependent
equilibria. We begin to explore this possibility by ﬁrst studying the individ-
ual incentives of a corruptible bureaucrat to engage in corruption under two
opposite scenarios - one in which no other corruptible bureaucrat is corrupt
and the other in which all other corruptible bureaucrats are corrupt. In doing
so, we make use of the results in (2) and (3), where G is recalled to measure
the aggregate quality, or total productive services, of public goods.
25An alternative way of modelling this is to assume that bureaucrats must consume
their illegal income immediately if they are to stand any chance of avoiding detection.
13For the case in which no corruptible bureaucrat is corrupt, G is given by
b G = g since all bureaucrats procure only high-quality public goods (yielding




). Under such circumstances, (4) becomes
(φ − θ)g
n
≥ (1 − p)(1 + b r)b wt ≡ b h(kt), (5)
where
b r =( 1− α)Al
αg
β, (6)
b wt = αAl
α−1g
βkt ≡ b w(kt). (7)
The expression in (5) is the condition for an individual corruptible bureaucrat
to be corrupt, given that no other corruptible bureaucrat is corrupt.
For the case in which all corruptible bureaucrats are corrupt, G is de-
termined as e G =( 1− ν + γν)g since only non-corrupt bureaucrats procure










). As such, (4) becomes
(φ − θ)g
n
≥ (1 − p)(1 + e r)e wt ≡ e h(kt), (8)
where
e r =( 1− α)Al
α(1 − ν + γν)
βg
β, (9)
e wt = αAl
α−1(1 − ν + γν)
βg
βkt ≡ e w(kt). (10)
The expression in (8) is the condition for an individual corruptible bureaucrat
to be corrupt, given that all other corruptible bureaucrats are corrupt.
Observe that, since 1−ν+γν < 1, (6) and (9) imply e r<b r, while (7) and
(10) imply e w(·) < b w(·): that is, for any given stock of capital, kt, interest
rates and wages are lower under corruption than under non-corruption. This
follows from the fact that corruption reduces the aggregate quality of public
goods, e G<b G. In doing so, it also reduces the productivity of other inputs
(capital and labour) in output production.
4 Equilibria
The foregoing analysis sets out the conditions for an individual corruptible
bureaucrat to be either corrupt or non-corrupt, given that all other corrupt-
ible bureaucrats are either corrupt or non-corrupt. The analysis also reveals
14the extent to which the aggegate level of corruption inﬂuences aggregate eco-
nomic outcomes - in particular, interest rates, wages and the quality of public
goods provision. We now proceed to study how the incidence of corruption,
itself, is determined. As we shall see, whether or not corruption forms part of
an equilibrium depends on the level of development of the economy. In this
way, our model predicts a relationship between corruption and development
that is fundamentally two-way causal.
The crucial conditions for determining equilibrium behaviour are given
in (5) and (8). Note that both b h(·) and e h(·) are increasing monotonically
(linearly) in kt.N o t ea l s ot h a tb h(·) > e h(·) for all kt. Given these observations,
we may identify two critical levels of capital, kc
1 and kc
2, in accordance with
the following.
Deﬁnition 1 kc




that (i) b h(·) <
(φ−θ)g
n for all kt <k c
1,a n d( i i )b h(·) >
(φ−θ)g
n for all kt >k c
1.
Deﬁnition 2 kc




that (i) e h(·) <
(φ−θ)g
n for all kt <k c
2,a n d( i i )e h(·) >
(φ−θ)g




2. These threshold levels of capital represent boundaries
between regions where the incentive conditions in (5) and (8) are either sat-
isﬁed or violated. We are now in a position to establish some key results
which we illustrate in Figure 1.
Proposition 1 For kt <k c
1, there exists a unique equilibrium in which all
corruptible bureaucrats are corrupt.
Proof. Suppose that kt <k c
1.T h e n e h(·) <
(φ−θ)g
n and b h(·) <
(φ−θ)g
n ,
implying that it pays each corruptible bureaucrat to be corrupt, irrespective
of whether other corruptible bureaucrats are corrupt or non-corrupt. The
case in which all such bureaucrats are corrupt is an equilibrium outcome since
none of them has an incentive to deviate from corrupt behaviour. Conversely,
the case in which all such bureaucrats are non-corrupt is not an equilibrium
outcome since each of them has an incentive to deviate from non-corrupt
behaviour.
This result demonstrates that low levels of development are associated with
high (maximum) levels of corruption.
Proposition 2 For kt >k c
2, there exists a unique equilibrium in which no
corruptible bureaucrat is corrupt.
15Proof. Suppose that kt >k c
2.T h e nb h(·) >
(φ−θ)g
n and e h(·) >
(φ−θ)g
n ,i m -
plying that it pays each corruptible bureaucrat to be non-corrupt, irrespec-
tive of whether other corruptible bureaucrats are non-corrupt or corrupt.
The case in which all such bureaucrats are non-corrupt is an equilibrium
outcome since none of them has an incentive to deviate from non-corrupt
behaviour. Conversely, the case in which all such bureaucrats are corrupt is
not an equilibrium outcome since each of them has an incentive to deviate
from corrupt behaviour.
This result demonstrates that high levels of development are associated with
low (zero) levels of corruption.
Proposition 3 For kt ∈ (kc
1,k c
2), there are multiple equilibria in which all
corruptible bureaucrats are either corrupt or non-corrupt.
Proof. Suppose that kt ∈ (kc
1,kc
2).T h e ne h(·) <
(φ−θ)g
n but b h(·) >
(φ−θ)g
n ,
implying that it pays each corruptible bureaucrat to be either corrupt or non-
corrupt, depending on whether other corruptible bureaucrats are corrupt
or non-corrupt. The case in which all such bureaucrats are corrupt is an
equilibrium outcome since none of them has incentive to deviate from corrupt
behaviour. Likewise, the case in which all such bureaucrats are non-corrupt
is also an equilibrium outcome since none of them has an incentive to deviate
from non-corrupt behaviour.
This result demonstrates that intermediate levels of development may be
associated with either low or high levels of corruption.
Based on the foregoing analysis, we are led to distinguish between three
types of development regime for the economy. The ﬁrst - a low development
regime - is one in which the incidence of corruption is always at its maximum
for any given level of capital below the lower threshold level, kc
1. The second
- a high development regime - is one in which the incidence of corruption is
always at its minimum for any given level of capital above the upper thresh-
old level, kc
2. And the third - an intermediate development regime - is one
in which the incidence of corruption may be either at its maximum or at
its minimum for any given level of capital between the two thresholds. The
intuition is as follows. Each corruptible bureaucrat chooses to be corrupt or
non-corrupt according to whether the condition in (4) is satisiﬁed or violated.
This condition depends on economy-wide outcomes (wages and interest rates)
which, in turn, depend on the existing aggregate stock of capital (measur-
ing the level of development) and the total quality of public goods provision
16(reﬂecting the behaviour of all other bureaucrats). At suﬃciently low or suf-
ﬁciently high levels of development, a bureaucrat’s incentive to behave in one
way or another is unaﬀected by how other bureaurcrats are behaving: what
matters most is the level of development, itself. For capital stocks below kc
1,
wages are always low enough to ensure that the condition in (4) is satisﬁed.
As such, a corruptible bureaucrat will always be corrupt, irrespective of what
others around him may be doing. Since this is true for all such bureaucrats,
then the only equilibrium from which there is no incentive to deviate is one
in which corruption is the unique choice of strategy. Conversely, for capital
stocks above kc
2, wages are always high enough such that the condition in
(4) is violated. In this case a corruptible bureaucrat will never be corrupt,
regardless of what others may be up to. Being true for all such bureaucrats,
this means that the only equilibrium from which defection will not occur is
one in which non-corruption is the singular choice of action. In contrast to
these scenarios, a bureaucrat’s incentive to transgress at intermediate stages
of development depends critically on the exploits of others. For any given
stock of capital between kc
1 and kc
2, the condition in (4) is satisﬁed if cor-
ruption is widespread but is violated if corruption is absent. A corruptible
bureaucrat will now be corrupt or non-corrupt according to whether other
such bureaucrats are corrupt or non-corrupt. Consequently, there are two
candidate equilibria that are frequency-dependent and that are equally likely
to arise. As indicated earlier, our explanation for this non-uniqueness is dif-
ferent from other accounts and relates to the eﬀe c t so fc o r r u p t i o no nb o t h
wages and interest rates. These variables determine the legal incomes of
bureaucrats and are increasing functions of the quality of public goods provi-
sion. The lower is this quality (i.e., the more corruption there is) the lower is
the amount of income that a corrupt bureaucrat stands to lose if he is caught
and so the lower is the expected punishment for being corrupt. In this way,
a bureaucrat’s expected gain from wrong-doing depends positively on the
number of other wrong-doers - hence the possibility of multiple equilibria.
As we also indicated, our analysis has the further distinction of showing how
this possibility is inextricably linked to an economy’s stage of development:
only at intermediate stages is behaviour contagious; at other stages - both
lower and higher - individuals act independently of others.
The predictions of our model are consistent with the empirical observa-
tions highlighted earlier: the unique equilibrium at low levels of development
accords with the situation of most poor countries in which the incidence of
corruption is generally high; the unique equilibrium at high levels of devel-
opment matches the position of most rich countries in which the incidence
of corruption is typically low; and the multiplicity of equilibria at intermedi-
ate levels of development ﬁts with the diverse experiences of middle-income
17countries in which the incidence of corruption is varied. Like other analyses,
we are able to account for a broadly negative relationship between corrup-
tion and development. Unlike other analyses, we are also able to explain
why this relationship may be rather tenuous in some circumstances. In fact,
the results obtained above do not exhaust the full set of outcomes that are
p o s s i b l ea ti n t e r m e d i a t es t a g e so fd e v e l o p m e n t . I ns t u d y i n gt h i sc a s e ,w e
have conﬁned our attention to the two pure strategy equilibria that mani-
fest at low and high stages of development - that is, equilibria in which all
corruptible bureaucrats behave in exactly the same way. Yet there is also
a mixed strategy equilibrium in this case - that is, an equilibrium in which
bureaucratic behaviour is heterogeneous. More precisely, this equlibrium en-
tails a fraction, η ∈ (0,1), of corruptible bureaucrats who are corrupt and a
remaining fraction, 1−η, of such bureaucrats who are not corrupt. We show
this in an Appendix by establishing that, for each kt ∈ (kc
1,kc
2),t h e r ee x i s t s
an η such that the incentive condition in (4) holds with equality. This means
that a middle-income country could ﬁnd itself in any one of three possible
equilibria with an incidence of corruption that is high, low or somewhere in
between. The idea that, for some countries, development might be associ-
ated with an increase in corruption has been argued by a number of observers
who point to the potential for modernisation and liberalisation to create new
incentives and new opportunities for agents to engage in corrupt practices.
The experiences of several transition economies appear to bear testimony to
this (e.g., Bardhan 1997; Basu and Li 1998).
5 Public Finance and Capital Accumulation
We have seen how the incidence of corruption depends on the level of devel-
opment. We have yet to study how the development process, itself, is aﬀected
by corrupt activity. This process is described by the path of capital accu-
mulation, obtained from the equilibrium condition that the total demand for
capital is equal to the total supply of savings. To determine how corruption
aﬀects savings, it is necessary to consider how corruption aﬀects public ﬁ-
nances since the state of the government’s balance sheet dictates the level
of taxes required to maintain budget balance. In conducting our analysis,
we appeal to the law of large numbers to replace probabilistic events at the
individual level by actual outcomes at the aggregate level. Thus p (1 − p)
is understood to be a measure of corrupt bureaucrats who succeed (fail) in
their illegal proﬁteering, while q (1 − q) is understood to be a measure of
high-quality public goods that have low (high) cost.
Consider the case in which no corruptible bureaucrat is corrupt. Each and
18every bureaucrat, of whom there are n, claims the truthful amount of public
funds that he requires to procure high-quality public goods. The total value




, and the total value of claims for




.A c c o r d i n g l y ,[q +( 1− q)φ]g = Φg is
the overall amount of resources that the government allocates to public goods
provision. The government also incurs expenditures of nb wt on bureaucrats’
salaries. On the revenue side, the government receives tax payments from
households of mb τt.T h e v a l u e o f b τt is determined from the government’s
budget constraint as
mb τt = Φg + nb wt. (11)
Total savings in the economy comprise the savings of households, m(λb wt −
τt + b), plus the savings of bureaucrats, nb wt.U s i n g( 7 )a n d( 1 1 ) ,i tf o l l o w s
that capital accumulation takes place according to
b kt+1 = lb wt − Φg + mb
= αAl
αg
βkt − Φg + mb ≡ b f(kt). (12)
Consider, next, the case in which all corruptible bureaucrats are corrupt.
These bureaucrats, of whom there are νn, make bogus claims on public funds
by pretending to procure high-quality public goods at high-cost (when the














in public funds. Accordingly, {(1−ν)[q+(1−
q)φ]+νφ}g =[ Φ+qν(φ−1)]g is the aggregate amount of resources that the
government now allocates to public goods provision. Added to this is ne wt,
expenditures on bureaucrats’ salaries. Revenues for the government comprise
the tax income from households, me τt, plus the value of ﬁnes imposed on
corrupt bureaucrats who are caught, (1 − p)νne wt.F r o m t h e g o v e r n m e n t ’ s
budget constraint, the value of e τt is deduced as
me τt =[ Φ + qν(φ − 1)]g +[ 1− (1 − p)ν]ne wt. (13)
As above, total savings by households amount to m(λb wt − τt + b).T o t a l
savings by bureaucrats consist of the savings by non-corruptible bureaucrats,
(1 − ν)ne wt, plus the savings of corruptible bureaucrats, pνne wt.U s i n g ( 1 0 )
and (13), we may write the capital accumulation process in this case as
e kt+1 = le wt − [Φ + qν(φ − 1)]g + mb
= αAl
α(1 − ν + γν)
βg
β − [Φ + qν(φ − 1)]g + mb ≡ e f(kt). (14)
Assuming that αAlαgβ ∈ (0,1) and mb > [Φ + qv(φ − 1)]g,b o t ho ft h e
transitions paths in (12) and (14) exhibit stationary points associated with
19the steady state levels of capital b k∗ =
mb−Φg
1−αAlαgβ and e k∗ =
mb−[Φ+qν(φ−1)]g
1−αAlα(1−ν+γν)βgβ,
respectively. Evidently, e k∗ < b k∗ which follows from the fact that, for any
given kt, e f(·) < b f(·). Thus capital accumulation is lower under corruption
than under non-corruption. There are two reasons for this. First, by reducing
the total quality of public goods, corruption produces a fall in the produc-
tivity of labour, a fall in wages and a fall in savings. Second, by raising the
total cost of public goods, corruption leads to greater public expenditures
which also results in lower savings.26 In short, corruption aﬀects both the
quality and quantity of public spending in ways that compromise growth.
This spending is not only misallocated (towards low-quality public goods)
but is also inﬂated (by an artiﬁcial amount). This is another prediction of
the model that concurs with empirical observation.
As well as accounting for cross-country diﬀerences in corruption, our
analysis is able to explain why some countries may become saddled with
persistent poverty and misgovernance. We illustrate this in Figure 2 which
depicts the two development paths, b f(·) and e f(·), together with the two
threshold levels of capital, kc
1 and kc
2, for a particular conﬁguration of pa-
rameter values. The economy is on the low development path, e f(·),f o r
kt <k c
1, the high development path, b f(·),f o rkt >k c
2, and either of the paths
for kt ∈ (kc
1,kc
2). At the steady state level of capital e k∗,t h e r ei sap o v e r t y
trap equilibrium: if the economy is poor and corrupt to begin with (e.g., if
its initial capital stock is k0), then it will be destined to remain poor and
corrupt unless there is a radical turn of events to dictate otherwise. One such
event is a windfall increase in the stock of capital that produces a leap over
the lower threshold, kc
1. Another is a change in the value of some key pa-
rameter that alters the transition function and/or the threshold, itself, such
that kc
1 < e k∗. Even in these instances, however, there is no guarantee that
the upper critical boundary, kc
2, will be breached, in which case the economy
will have just as much chance of settling in a good equilibrium as settling in
a bad equilibrium. In addition, for a given distribution of economies below
kc
1, it is those in the upper tail (i.e., close to kc
1)t h a ta r em o s tl i k e l yt ob e
aﬀected, while those in the lower tail remain as they are. For these reasons,
we are led to conclude that the divisions between poor and rich, corrupt and
26Observe from (11) and (13) that taxes may be higher or lower under corruption than
under non-corruption. This is because corruption, while resulting in greater public ex-
penditures, leads to lower payment of salaries to bureaucrats (since some bureaucrats are
dismissed from their jobs). Whether corruption exists or not, bureaucrats’ salaries do not
contribute to aggregate savings since they are completely oﬀset by the taxes used to pay
for them. Over and above this, taxes fund public expenditures which are higher under
corruption.
20non-corrupt, countries are unlikely to vanish quickly, if at all.
6F i n a l R e m a r k s
In seeking to understand how countries develop (or not), economists have
become increasingly aware of the need to integrate the economic, social and
political aspects of individual decision making, policy formulation and insti-
tutional design. There has also been growing recognition that many issues
in development are diﬃcult, if not impossible, to address without departing
from the standard economic paradigm of honest, law-abiding agents whose
pursuit of what is best for themselves entails no malevolence towards oth-
ers. To many observers, there is a much harsher, more cynical reality, where
agents are often devious, predatory and even cruel. When holders of pub-
lic oﬃce are like this, the consequences can be particularly devastating and
tragic. Corruption on the part of public oﬃcials may mean a world of dif-
ference between what policies are good for a nation and what policies are
actually implemented. The latter may have much less to do with the pro-
motion of growth and reduction of poverty, and much more to do with the
personal enrichment of a privelaged few following their own hidden agenda.
In spite of the above, there exists relatively little theoretical research on
the macroeconomics of misgovernance. Our objective in this paper has been
to make a contribution towards ﬁlling this gap. The model that we have
used contains the essential ingredients that public policy is implemented by
subordinate oﬃcials whose interests conﬂict with superiors and whose pur-
suit of these interests entails corrupt practices that impose costs on society
as a whole. Our speciﬁc focus of attention has been on corruption in public
procurement, where bureaucrats exploit their powers of discretion in pro-
viding public goods to falsify information and embezzle public funds. The
main results of our analysis may be summarised as follows. First, corruption
and development are determined jointly in a relationship that is two-way
causal: bureaucratic malfeasance both inﬂuences and is inﬂuenced by eco-
nomic activity. Second, this two-way causality gives rise to threshold eﬀects
and multiple development regimes: there is a low development regime, a
high development regime and an intermediate development regime. Third,
the equilibrium properties of these regimes are very diﬀerent: in low stages
of development there is a unique equilibrium with high corruption, in high
stages of development there is a unique equilibrium with low corruption, and
in intermediate stages of development there are both types of equilibrium.
Fourth, transition between regimes may or may not be feasible and it is pos-
sible for a development trap to occur: corruption and poverty may become
21permanent ﬁxtures of an economy unless fundamental changes take place.
Fifth, corruption distorts both the quantity and quality of public expendi-
tures: these expenditures are not only inﬂated, but also misdirected towards
the provision of low-quality public goods.
The above results do well in explaining a number of empirical observa-
tions: corruption is higher in poor countries than in rich countries; corruption
is more varied among middle-income countries; corruption can be persistent
and may be alleviated only slowly by development; corruption can compro-
mise development by distorting public expenditures. Based on these insights,
we view our analysis as a promising step towards understanding an issue that
is dominating the international development arena.
22Appendix
We establish the existence of a mixed strategy equilibrium in the intermediate
development regime. Suppose that, for kt ∈ (kc
1,k c
2), there is a fraction,
η ∈ (0,1) (1 − η), of corruptible bureaucrats who are corrupt (non-corrupt).
Proceeding in the usual way, we may derive the following expressions for
interest rates and wages:
r =( 1− α)Al




α−1[1 − ην(1 − γ)]
β(sg)
βkt ≡ w(kt), (A2)
The condition for a corruptible bureaucrat to be corrupt is
(φ − θ)sg
n
≥ (1 − p)(1 + r)wt ≡ h(kt), (15)
It is straightforward to verify that, for a given kt and a given η ∈ (0,1),
b r>r>e r and b wt > wt > e wt so that b h(·) > h(·) > e h(·). In terms of Figure 1,
the curve h(·) always lies between the curves b h(·) and e h(·). It follows that,
within the region (kc
1,k c
2), there is a single intersection between
(φ−θ)sg
n and
h(·). Consequently, for any given kt ∈ (kc
1,kc
2),t h e r ee x i s t sa nη ∈ (0,1) such
that
(φ−θ)sg
n = h(·), implying that each corruptible bureaucrat is indiﬀerent
between being corrupt and non-corrupt. This η is the fraction of corrupt
corruptible bureaucrats that supports a mixed strategy equilibrium.
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 Corruption Across Countries 
 
 
Index  BIC ICRG TI 
  Total range
1  1.00-10.00 1.00-6.00  0.00-10.00 
  Year  1980-83  1991-97  2001 
Number of Countries
      
  Total
2  59 113  87 
  Low income  5  33  19 
  Middle income  37  59  47 
    Lower middle income  21  43  28 
    Upper middle income  16  16  19 
  High income  17  21  21 
Range of index      
  Low income  1.00-4.00  1.44-4.00  0.40-3.5 
  Middle income  1.50-10.00  1.03-5.00  2.00-7.50 
    Lower middle income  1.50-8.75  1.03-5.00  2.00-6.00 
    Upper middle income  3.25-10.00  1.05-5.00  2.80-7.50 
  High income  7.50-10.00  4.38-6.00  6.60-9.90 
Variance of index      
  Low income  2.00  0.55  0.57 
  Middle income  4.07  0.79  1.40 
    Lower middle income  4.41  0.67  1.08 
    Upper middle income  3.44  1.14  1.21 
  High income  0.33  0.34  0.93 
 
1. Greater levels of corruption are indicated by lower values of the indices. 
2. To facilitate comparisons between the indices, oil-exporting countries have been excluded from the 
BIC and ICRG data sets. Other countries excluded from the BIC index are India, Iraq and Sri Lanka 
due to questions about the reliability of the data. Italy, which is a major outlier among high-income 
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